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The “Wittem Group” of copyright scholars has proposed a 
“European Copyright Code,” to “serve as an important reference tool for 
future legislatures at the European and national levels.”  Because, 
notwithstanding twenty years of Directives and a growing ECJ caselaw, 
copyright law in EU Member States continues to lack uniformity, the 
Wittem Group’s endeavor should be welcomed, at least as a starting point 
for reflection on the desirable design of an EU copyright regime.  Whether 
or not the proposed Code succeeds in influencing national or Community 
legislation, it does offer an occasion to consider the nature of the rights 
that copyright secures, and of the goals that a copyright system should 
serve. 
 
The following commentary will reproduce the provisions of the 
proposed Code, together with annotations of particular articles.  The 
proposed Code contains five chapters: (1) Works; (2) Authorship and 
Ownership; (3) Moral Rights; (4) Economic Rights; (5) Limitations.  The 
text provides neither for remedies, nor for voluntary formalities.  It also 
does not address neighboring rights.  The five chapters vary in ambition, 
from cautious synthesis to radical prescription.  If some timidity 
characterizes the chapters addressing authors’ rights, the hallmark of the 
chapter on limitations is its temerity, displaying an impetus to break 
through the rigidity of the current EU and national systems of copyright 
exceptions in order to favor EU-wide uses of copyrighted works in which, 
in the drafters’ perception, the interests of third parties, including the 
public, outweigh those of the authors or copyright owners.  Reaction to the 
Wittem endeavor may turn at least in part on one’s assessment of whether 
the drafters have correctly stated and/or weighted the third party interests. 
 
 
“European Copyright Code” – Back to first principles (with some additional detail) 
 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Columbia University School of Law^ 
 
 
The “Wittem Group” of copyright scholars has proposed a “European Copyright Code,” 
to “serve as an important reference tool for future legislatures at the European and national 
                                                            
^ Thanks to Professors Lionel Bently, Bernt Hugenholtz, Alain Strowel and Raquel Xalabarder for responding to my 
queries about the Wittem Draft; while they have helped me understand some of its objectives, I in no way suggest 
that any of them would subscribe to my criticisms (if anything, I expect much of my analysis would provoke 
considerable disagreement). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1747148
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levels.”*  Because, notwithstanding twenty years of Directives and a growing ECJ caselaw, 
copyright law in EU Member States continues to lack uniformity, the Wittem Group’s endeavor 
should be welcomed, at least as a starting point for reflection on the desirable design of an EU 
copyright regime.  This (American) writer, however, is not qualified to comment on the proposed 
Code from the point of view of the EU “acquis.”  Rather, I will address the proposed text from 
the perspectives both of international norms, particularly those set out in the Berne Convention, 
and of first principles (although I will occasionally refer to EU norms as well).  Whether or not 
the proposed Code succeeds in influencing national or Community legislation, it does offer an 
occasion to consider the nature of the rights that copyright secures, and of the goals that a 
copyright system should serve. 
 
The following commentary will reproduce the provisions of the proposed Code, together 
with annotations of particular articles.  I will begin, however, with some general observations.  
The proposed Code contains five chapters: (1) Works; (2) Authorship and Ownership; (3) Moral 
Rights; (4) Economic Rights; (5) Limitations.  The text provides neither for remedies, nor for 
voluntary formalities.  It also does not address neighboring rights.  The five chapters vary in 
ambition, from cautious synthesis to radical prescription.  If some timidity characterizes the 
chapters addressing authors’ rights, the hallmark of the chapter on limitations is its temerity.  As 
a result, to this common law commentator, the text echoes the utilitarian premises of the 
common law tradition at least as much it reflects the author-based norms of the civilian heritage.   
 
Any endeavor to meld civilian and common law approaches to copyright may inevitably 
dissatisfy all sides at least sometimes, and the drafters therefore deserve applause for persevering 
in an attempt some might consider quixotic and others (from both ends of the property 
rights/users’ rights spectrum) might view with some suspicion.  But the drafters are correct that 
the persistence of significant differences in national regimes mars the effective protection and 
dissemination of works of authorship within the EU.  The founders of the US federal republic in 
1787 recognized the need for uniform national law, precisely because the “States cannot 
separately make effectual provision” for works whose exploitation often if not always crosses 
internal borders (Federalist No. 43 [Madison]).   But the U.S. Framers were writing on an 
almost-clean slate; the drafters of the Wittem Code are confronting three hundred years of 
separate national copyright development, each national regime reflecting its own legal traditions 
and cultural policies.  Hence, perhaps, the caution that characterizes much of the draft.  On the 
other hand, the bold approach of the last chapter suggests a different impetus, to break through 
the rigidity of the current EU and national systems of copyright exceptions in order to favor EU-
wide uses of copyrighted works in which, in the drafters’ perception, the interests of third parties, 
including the public, outweigh those of the authors or copyright owners.  Reaction to the Wittem 
endeavor may turn at least in part on one’s assessment of whether the drafters have correctly 
stated and/or weighted the third party interests.   
  
Additional cause for concern (or quibble) might start with the title “European Copyright 
Code,” whose adoption of the English locution might to some mask a sidelining of the author 
from her central place in Continental systems, whose laws generally are denominated (in their 
various languages) authors’ rights.  In fact, the proposed Code’s ambivalences about copyright 
                                                            




seem more directed to its scope than to its subject.  Relative to common law systems, the 
author’s place may even be reinforced, though compared to some civil law regimes, some of the 
provisions on ownership may represent a loss of ground.  With respect to the scope of copyright, 
the common law/civil law divide is displaced by another contrast, the tension between authors’ 
rights and user rights, with the latter orientation appearing to prevail.  Parts of the text also seem 
to betray a certain technological determinism.  For example, the Preamble declares that a “fully 
functioning market for copyright protected works in the European Union” is “necessitated in 
particular by the Internet as the primary means of providing information and entertainment 
services across the Member States” (emphasis supplied).  This is a revealing overstatement, for it 
suggests that the concerns of digital dissemination (a value whose achievement many in the 
academy and the “blogosphere” view copyright as impeding) not merely informed but 
predominantly influenced the drafting at least of parts of the proposed Code.  But digital is not 
everything: other modes of exploitation remain, and a variety of copyright issues (including ones 
affecting cross-border commerce) both predate the digital era and persist notwithstanding it. 
 
More fundamentally, while the rhetoric of “balance” imbues the text, on closer inspection 
“balance” often seems to resemble a coded version of “cutting back on exclusive rights” or, more 
baldly, “users’ rights.”  Thus, for example, the Preamble continues: 
 
copyright law in the EU should reflect the core principles and values of European law, 
including freedom of expression and information as well as freedom of competition 
 
Curiously, the cited “values” do not include the “right to property” enshrined in article 17 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which further specifies that “Intellectual 
property shall be protected.”**  While the Charter does not specify how, or how much, 
intellectual property “shall be protected,” its effective protection would nonetheless also seem a 
“core principle and value” deserving of recognition in the proposed Code’s initial 
Considerations.   
 
 The next paragraph of the Preamble seems to send mixed messages: 
 
copyright protection in the European Union finds its justification and its limits in the need 
to protect the moral and economic interests of creators, while serving the public interest 
by promoting the production and dissemination of works in the field of literature, art and 
science by granting to creators limited exclusive rights for limited times in their works 
(emphases supplied) 
 
On the one hand, the draft Code proposes the first EU-wide recognition of authors’ moral rights, 
and to that extent constitutes an advance from the point of view of authors’ rights (particularly 
for States, such as the UK, whose adoption of moral rights is both recent and reluctant).  The 
moral rights the proposed Code provides (to be discussed in more detail regarding Chapter 3) 
are, moreover, inalienable (though they can be waived, including, it would seem, in a standard 
form contract).  On the other hand, the drafters appear, consciously or not, to have rejected the 
                                                            
** Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art 17.  OJEU C 303/01 (2007) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:0001:0016:EN:PDF  Article 11 covers the 
right to freedom of expression and art. 
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jus naturalis conception of copyright that animates many Continental European national laws 
(and that underlies moral rights).  For example, the French Code of Intellectual Property, in its 
first article, pronounces: « L'auteur d'une oeuvre de l'esprit jouit sur cette oeuvre, du seul fait de 
sa création, d'un droit de propriété incorporelle exclusif et opposable à tous.» ***  The exclusive 
“right” arises “from the sole fact of the work’s creation”; it is not “granted” by law.  By 
demoting the claims of creators to the status of “interests” absent mediation by the State, the 
drafters have adopted a positivistic approach that may not be fully consistent with an important 
current of copyright law within Europe, or, for that matter, with some of the premises underlying 
the principle of automatic and independent protection consecrated by the Berne Convention ever 
since its 1908 Berlin revision.  Indeed, even common law countries, notwithstanding their 
generally more positivistic outlook, are not immune to the appeal of the creation-centered basis 
of copyright, as an Irish judge recently recognized: "Copyright is a universal entitlement to be 
identified with and to sell, and therefore to enjoy, the fruits of creative work." (Emphasis 
supplied.)****  I am not asserting that the proposed Code is necessarily “wrong” to part with this 
European copyright tradition, but the apparent shift is nonetheless striking.  That said, much of 
the proposed Code reflects authorship-based norms (whatever their justification), including, in 
addition to moral rights, an authorial standard of originality, an open-ended conception of the 
work, and an author-centric rule of initial copyright ownership.   
 
Finally, with respect to the Preamble, we find another soothing, but perhaps misleading, 
appeal to equilibrium: 
 
rapid technological development makes future modes of exploitation and use of copyright 
works unpredictable and therefore requires a system of rights and limitations with some 
flexibility (emphasis supplied) 
 
As we will see, the proffered system of limitations is indeed designed with the “flexibility” to 
expand in response to technological developments and future modes of exploitation.   It is not 
clear, however, that the rights the proposed Code articulates are consistently subject to 
concomitantly flexible growth.  Indeed, the later chapters of the proposed Code betray the most 
marked departures from the traditional authorship-grounded concept of copyright. 
 









*** CPI art. L. 1-111 
**** EMI Records & Ors -v- Eircom Ltd, [2010] IEHC 108 para 3.  I cannot avoid pointing out that the “universality” 
of the “entitlement” could in fact be more widespread.  In the US, for example, there is, most regrettably, no right to 
be identified with the fruits of one’s creative work. 
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- that the establishment of a fully functioning market for copyright protected works in the 
European Union, as necessitated in particular by the Internet as the primary means of providing 
information and entertainment services across the Member States, 
requires common rules on copyright in the EU that reflect and integrate both the civil and 
common law traditions of copyright and authors’ right respectively; 
- that twenty years of harmonization has brought only partial harmonization on certain aspects of 
the law of copyright in the Member States of the EU; 
- that the consistency and transparency of the harmonized rules on copyright in the EU ought to 
be improved; 
- that copyright law in the EU should reflect the core principles and values of European law, 




- that copyright protection in the European Union finds its justification and its limits in the need 
to protect the moral and economic interests of creators, while serving the public interest by 
promoting the production and dissemination of works in the field of literature, art and science by 
granting to creators limited exclusive rights for limited times in their works; 
- that copyright legislation should achieve an optimal balance between protecting the interests of 
authors and right holders in their works and securing the freedom  to access, build upon and use 
these works; 
- that rapid technological development makes future modes of exploitation and use of copyright 





- that the design of a European Copyright Code might serve as an important reference tool for 
future legislatures at the European and national levels;  
 
Taking note  
 
- of the norms of the main international treaties in the field of copyright that have been signed 
and ratified by the EU and its Member States, in particular the Berne Convention, the TRIPs 
Agreement and the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and of the harmonized standards set by the EC 
directives in the field of  copyright and related rights; 
  
Proposes the following European Copyright Code:  
 
Chapter 1: Works 
 




(1)  Copyright subsists in a work1, that is to say, any2 expression3 within the field of literature, art 
or science4 in so far as it5 constitutes its author’s own6 intellectual creation7. 
 
Comment: This is a well-accepted definition, but, given the importance of the principle, 
the rejection of a criterion of literary or artistic worthiness or of form perhaps might have 
been emphasized in the text of the article rather than merely in footnote 2.  There may 
also be some ambiguity regarding what constitutes the “author’s own intellectual 
creation.”  The text echoes the norm of the various Directives, but footnote 7 muddies the 
waters a bit by stating “For factual and functional works, the focus will be more on a 
certain level of skill (judgement) and labour, whereas for productions in the artistic field 
the focus will be more on personal expression.”  Footnote 3, however, makes personal 
expression a necessary constituent of a “work”; in that event, there seems to be some 
contradiction if “skill and labour” suffice to meet the “own intellectual creation” 
standard.   
  
(2)  The following in particular are regarded8 to be within the field of literature, art or science 
within the meaning of this article: 
 
a. Written or spoken words, 
b. Musical compositions 
c. Plays and choreographies, 
d. Paintings, graphics, photographs and sculptures, 
e. Films, 
f. Industrial and architectural designs, 
g. Computer programs, 
h. Collections, compilations and databases. 
 
 Comment: The text does not specify the classification of composite works such as 
musical compositions with accompanying text, or plays with accompanying music.  By 
                                                            
1 The term ‘work’ is used throughout this Code as a general term to denote subject matter protected by copyright as 
defined in this article. It does not cover subject matter protected by what is usually referred to as neighbouring or 
related rights. 
2 ‘Any’ denotes “whatever may be its mode or form of expression or its merit”. There is no requirement of fixation. 
An adaptation of a work may qualify as a work itself. 
3 The term ‘expression’ indicates the traditional requirement that works be the result of the author’s personal 
expression. 
4 The term ‘literary, artistic or scientific expressions’, which is inspired by art. 2(1)BC, circumscribes the domain of 
copyright, and serves as “Oberbegriff”. 
5 ‘In so far as’ indicates that the requirement of constituting ‘its author’s own, intellectual creation’ is not merely a 
condition for the existence of copyright, but also defines its limits.  
6 The Code does not use or define the term original, but in practice it might still be used to indicate that the 
production qualifies as a (protected) work. 
7 The term ‘the author’s own intellectual creation’ is derived from the acquis (notably for computer programs, 
databases and photographs). It can be interpreted as the “average” European threshold, presuming it is set somewhat 
higher than skill and labour. This is possible if emphasis is put on the element of creation. For factual and functional 
works, the focus will be more on a certain level of skill (judgement) and labour, whereas for productions in the 
artistic field the focus will be more on personal expression.   
8 The categories listed here are merely examples and should not be taken to be exhaustive. The exemplary list 
indicates ‘core’ areas of copyright. 
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apparently leaving this matter to national legislation, the proposed Code allows for 
disuniformity in the authorship status of these works as joint works or as separate albeit 
conjoined works.  Failure to propose a Europe-wide characterization introduces possible 
complexity when such works are differently classified in different countries, with 
resulting differences in their terms of protection, as well, perhaps, as the scope of transfer 
of rights. 
 The choice of the term “films” rather than “audiovisual works” also seems 
curiously tied to a particular (and obsolescing) medium of fixation, and unnecessarily 
narrower than the already well-recognized designation “audiovisual works.”  While 
footnote 8 makes clear that the list of works is not exhaustive, its designation of the listed 
works as within the “‘core’ areas of copyright” may leave some ambiguity regarding 
audiovisual works that would not be regarded as “films”, such as videogames fixed in 
digital media. 
 Finally, the text does not incorporate the well-established principle (see, e.g., 
Berne Conv. art. 2.5) that any copyright in “collections, compilations and databases” is 
independent of and “without prejudice to” the copyright or public domain status of the 
pre-existing material incorporated in the work.  On the other hand, because art 1.1(3) 
establishes that certain component materials, such as facts, are not “in themselves” the 
subject matter of copyright, it should be implicit that inclusion of those materials in a 
collection, compilation or database does not thereby endow them with copyright. 
 
(3) The following are not, in themselves,9 to be regarded as expressions within the field of 
literature, art or science within the meaning of this article:10 
 
a. Facts, discoveries, news and data11; 
b. Ideas and theories; 
c. Procedures, methods of operation and mathematical concepts.12 
   
Art. 1.2 – Excluded works 
 
The following works are not protected by copyright: 
 
a. Official texts of a legislative, administrative and judicial nature, including international 
treaties, as well as official translations of such texts; 
b. Official documents published13 by the public authorities.14 
                                                            
9 The term ‘as such’ has built up a lot of jurisprudence under the EPC art 52, and is therefore avoided here. 
10 Whereas art. 1.1 (3) designates subject matter that as a matter of principle does not fall within the domain of 
copyright, art. 1.2 deals with works that do fall within the domain of copyright, but are excluded from copyright 
protection. 
11 Cf. art. 10(2) TRIPS: such protection shall not extend to the data or material itself; see also art. 3(2) Database 
Directive. 
12 Cf. art. 9(2) TRIPS. 
13 The term ‘published’ does not imply that a work must formally have been published in an Official Journal or 
equivalent. However, secret or confidential information can not be considered as ‘published’. 
14 As to ‘official’ works by private authors, these will be protected until they become ‘official’. Also, questions of 




Comment:  This text goes farther than (and, to this writer, improves on) Berne 
Convention art. 2.4, which leaves it to Member States to determine whether or not to 
extend copyright to official documents.  The text does not, however, define “official 
document,” and is problematic with respect to unpublished official documents, such as 
the notes of public officials.  If, as footnote 13 establishes, only published documents are 
excluded from copyright, may public officials invoke the copyright law to protect 
unpublished texts from public disclosure?  Copyright should not double as an Official 
Secrets Act; it might have been preferable to exclude all works of public officials created 
in the execution of their functions, and to look to other laws to preserve secrecy.   
 
 
Chapter 2: Authorship and ownership 
  
Art. 2.1 – Authorship 
 
The author of a work is the natural person or group of natural persons who created it.15 
 
Comment:  Consistently with the civilian tradition, the text properly affirms the principle 
that an “author” is the (or a) actual human creator of a work, rather than the natural or 
juridical person who instigates or assumes the economic risk of its creation.  Moreover, 
the proposed Code retains the human focus by vesting the human creator with moral and 
economic rights (articles 2.2 and 2.3(1)).  That said, works with multiple contributors 
may present special problems.  Footnote 15 adopts the Term Directive’s simplification of 
the authorship status of audiovisual works, but thereby leaves ambiguous the status of 
other creative contributors, such as cinematographers.  In the absence of other European 
rules determining authorship status in the case of a multiplicity of potential creative 
claimants, the proposed Code offers no guidance beyond the implicit instruction to 
ascertain whether the claimed contribution meets the “own intellectual creation” 
standard.  That in turn would appear to leave it to member States (with concomitant risks 
of disuniformity) to determine whether there is some threshold of quantity (or quality?) 
of the contribution before it can be deemed sufficiently the contributor’s “own” to make 
the contributor a joint author. 
  
Art. 2.2 – Moral rights 
 
(1) The author of the work has the moral rights. 
(2) Moral rights cannot be assigned. 
 
Comment: The non assignability of moral rights apparently would not preclude the 
designation of an agent to defend them, perhaps together with the moral rights of 
similarly situated authors.  
  
                                                            
15 In case of films such co-authors include the director, the author of the screenplay and the author of the dialogue 




Art. 2.3 – Economic rights 
  
(1) The initial owner of the economic rights in a work is its author. 
(2)  Subject to the restrictions of article 2.4, the economic rights in a work may be assigned16, 
licensed17 and passed by inheritance, in whole or in part. 
(3)  If the author has assigned economic rights, he shall nonetheless have a right to an adequate 
part of the remuneration on the basis of the provisions in articles 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5.  
(4)  An assignment is not valid unless it is made in writing. 
 
Comment: This article exposes the – to this writer – timidity of the proposed Code with 
respect to the rights of authors.  The drafters have forgone the general guarantees of 
“proportional” or “adequate” remuneration for each mode of exploitation of the work 
familiar in French and German copyright laws.  Article 2.3 does provide for “adequate 
remuneration” in certain instances, but those cases are limited to participation in 
compensation resulting from certain compulsory licenses instituted in connection with a 
variety of limitations on the scope of exclusive rights.  There is no general principle of 
adequate or proportional remuneration flowing from the author’s voluntary grant or 
license of exclusive rights.   
 With respect to the remuneration rights, these pertain to a wide variety of uses 
“for the purposes of freedom of expression and information”; “to promote social, political 
and cultural objectives,” to “enhance competition” and for “any other use that is 
comparable.”  The capaciousness of these exceptions will be examined in connection 
with Chapter 5 of the proposed Code.  For present purposes a few remarks are in order.  
First, it appears that the author’s share (however calculated) of the proceeds of these 
remuneration rights is intended to be inalienable.  In providing “If the author has assigned 
economic rights, he shall nonetheless have a right to an adequate part of the 
remuneration” deriving from the compensated limitations on exclusive rights, one may 
infer that the various compulsory licenses authorized under Chapter 5 must set some part 
of the payments aside for authors notwithstanding the author’s grant of economic rights.  
An ambiguity might nonetheless arise, however, regarding the characterization of these 
remuneration rights.  If one contends that the remuneration rights are not “economic 
rights” in the sense of exclusive rights, because they flow from exemptions from (rather 
than exercise of) exclusive rights, then the assignment of economic rights would be 
irrelevant to the allocation of remuneration rights.  If the remuneration rights are distinct, 
and vest in the author, perhaps they could nonetheless be the object of separate 
assignment.  It might have been preferable had the text emulated the EU Rental Right 
Directive by explicitly providing for an “unwaivable right to equitable remuneration.” 
(Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related 
to copyright in the field of intellectual property, art 5.) 
 
                                                            
16 The term ‘assignment’ indicates a cession of economic rights; ownership of the rights is transferred to another 
person. 
17 The term ‘license’ indicates an act of authorisation (permission) to use the work. 
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 Second, article 5.4 of the proposed Code introduces a user entitlement to “uses of 
news articles, scientific works, industrial designs, computer programs and databases 
[which] are permitted without authorisation, but only against payment of a negotiated 
remuneration.”  Footnote 54 specifies that “The term ‘negotiated remuneration’ means 
that the compulsory license fee is to be negotiated in individual cases, and therefore does 
not imply a role for collective rights management.”   It is not clear why the text bars 
collective management societies from negotiating the remuneration.  One may fear that 
without collective representation authors’ remuneration may be artificially low.  
Moreover, the individual transactions costs of negotiating the remuneration may 
discourage individual authors from enforcing their remuneration rights altogether.  In 
effect, this provision may take away with one hand the compensation it proposes with the 
other. 
 
 Finally, and more fundamentally, regarding mandatory remuneration rights 
accompanying copyright exceptions, if authors are not assured proportionate or adequate 
remuneration for grants of economic rights, but are guaranteed payment from 
compensated limitations on exclusive rights, then the more compulsory licenses replace 
exclusive rights, the better off authors might be.  This is a perverse outcome which could 
discredit copyright with the very constituency the property right arose to protect.  The 
combination of the proposed Code’s insufficient response to authors’ unequal bargaining 
power in the grant of exclusive rights with the draft’s provision for an “adequate” share 
of legally imposed licensing fees, while on the one hand better than no guarantee of 
remuneration at all, on the other hand could contribute to a weakening of exclusive rights.  
In the short term, if authors continue to depend on commercial intermediaries who drive 
leonine bargains in exchange for disseminating their work, a shift from exclusive rights to 
statutory remuneration rights may appear to authors’ advantage.  In the longer term, 
especially if reliable means of payment accompany the self-dissemination that digital 
media enable, authors could come to regret the Faustian exchange of exclusive rights for 
remuneration assurances. 
 
Art. 2.4 – Limits 
 
If the contract by which the author assigns or exclusively licenses the economic rights in his 
work does not adequately specify (a) the amount of the author’s remuneration, (b) the 
geographical scope, (c) the mode of exploitation and (d) the duration of the grant18, the extent of 
the grant shall be determined in accordance with the purpose envisaged in making the grant19. 
 
Comment:  This provision laudably endeavors to offset the shortcomings of art. 2.3 with 
a combination of the German/Dutch purpose of the grant rule and the French rule of 
specificity.  The provision appears designed to assure authors, at least as a starting point, 
                                                            
18 The term ‘grant’ is used here as an overarching term encompassing both assignment and license. 
19 Art. 2.4 is meant to protect authors against overbroad grants of rights. It does so by giving a primary rule and a 
subsidiary (default) rule. The primary rule requires adequate specification in the granting contract of the core 
features of such a contract: remuneration, geographical scope, modes of exploitation and duration of the grant. 
Failure to comply with the rule of specificity will not however nullify the grant, but will result in the default rule 
becoming operational. Under the default rule any grant of copyright is to be interpreted in accordance with the 
grant’s underlying purpose (purpose-of-grant rule). 
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retention of rights to modes of exploitation unknown or not commercially practiced at the 
time of the conclusion of the assignment or license.  Footnote 19 further explains how the 
rules should operate to limit the scope of the grant.  Nonetheless, a grant that complies 
with art. 2.4’s specificity requirement would appear to escape a narrowing construction.  
For example, the following standard clause contains all the requisite elements regarding 
amount of the author’s remuneration, geographical scope, mode of exploitation and 
duration: “For [specified amount] author grants all rights of reproduction and of 
communication to the public in all modes of exploitation for all media now known or 
later developed, for the full term of copyright and any renewals or extensions thereof, for 
the full territory, which shall be the Universe.”  If the “purpose of the grant” rule does not 
come into play unless the contract lacks specificity, then all-rights contracts, so long as 
sufficiently spelled-out, remain enforceable.  
  
Art. 2.5 – Works made in the course of employment 
 
Unless otherwise agreed, the economic rights in a work created by the author in the execution of 
his duties or following instructions given by his employer20 are deemed to be assigned to the 
employer. 
 
Comment:    This provision initially appears akin to the U.S. “works made for hire” 
regime for works created by employees in pursuit of their employment.  Unlike the U.S. 
copyright law, however, the proposed Code includes moral rights (Chapter 3), which the 
employee author retains.  But because, as provided in footnote 21, the mandatory 
remuneration rights of art. 2.3, and the narrowing construction of art. 2.4 do not apply, 
employee authors are completely divested of all economic rights, “unless otherwise 
agreed.”  This is an important proviso: because art. 2.5 does not reach commissioned 
works (unlike the U.S. work for hire regime) but presupposes an actual labor contract, 
salaried authors who are beneficiaries of collective bargaining agreements may be able to 
restrict the scope of the rights granted. 
 
Art. 2.6 – Works made on commission 
 
Unless otherwise agreed, the use of a work by the commissioner of that work is authorized to the 
extent necessary to achieve the purposes for which the commission was evidently made.21 
 
Comment: The default rule favors the commissioned author by imposing a narrowing 
construction, but the “unless otherwise agreed” clause allows for circumvention of this 
author protection, since it appears that the parties may agree to an all-rights transfer.   
 
  
Chapter 3: Moral rights 
                                                            
20 The scope of the assignment will therefore largely depend on the contract of employment between the author and 
the employer, as determined by applicable law. The general rules on assignment of art. 2.3 and 2.4 do not apply 
here. 





Art. 3.1 – General 
The moral rights in a work are the rights of divulgation, attribution and integrity, as provided for 
in articles 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. 
 
Art. 3.2 – Right of divulgation 
 
(1) The right of divulgation is the right to decide whether, and how the work is disclosed for the 
first time. 
 
Comment: The text does not specify that the author’s divulgation right also covers the 
author’s determination when to disclose a work.  The timing of divulgation is at least as 
important as the means, however.  Nonetheless, this gap may be closed if “whether” to 
disclose a work is construed to cover “when” as well. 
 
(2) This right shall last for the life of the author.22 
 
Comment:  The proposed Code conceptualizes the divulgation right as exclusively 
personal to the author.  Once the author has died, the heirs (unless they retain the 
economic rights) may not invoke moral rights to prevent the public dissemination of the 
work.  Footnote 22 clarifies, however, that other third-party rights, particularly privacy, 
may nonetheless impede the public disclosure of a deceased author’s work. 
 
Art. 3.3 – Right of attribution 
 
(1) The right of attribution comprises: 
a.  the right to be identified as the author,23 including the right to choose the manner of 
identification,24 and the right, if the author so decides, to remain unidentified. 
b.  the right to require that the name or title which the author has given to the work be 
indicated.  
 
Comment:  Footnote 23 to art. 3.3(1)(a) properly rejects the perverse requirement 
contained in the UK CDPA sec. 78, that author “assert” her attribution right in order to be 
able to enforce it.  Art 3.3(1)(b) introduces a new moral right to preserve and proclaim 
the author’s chosen title for the work. 
 
(2) This right shall last for the life of the author and until [...] years after his death.25 The legal 
successor as defined by the laws on inheritance26 is entitled to exercise the rights after the death 
of the author. 
                                                            
22 It was generally felt by the members of the group that not all moral rights merit the same term of protection, and 
that the right of divulgation might expire following the death of the author, whereas other moral rights could remain 
protected for a certain period post mortem. Note however that general rights of privacy might still prevent 
unauthorized publication post mortem of unpublished works. 
23 The existence of the right of attribution cannot depend on any condition, such as a claim or assertion by the 
author. 
24 The manner the author chooses to be identified should take into account the constraints resulting from the type of 




Comment:  While neither with respect to attribution nor integrity rights (see below, art. 
2.4(2)) could the drafters agree on a particular term of years post-mortem auctoris, it 
seems clear that in neither case was the right to be perpetual.  The non specification of a 
post-mortem term leaves open the possibility of assigning different durations to the 
rights.  Such a solution would make sense: the integrity right, like the divulgation right, 
may be most closely linked to the author’s person.  After her death, we may be more 
reluctant to allow her artistic vision – as interpreted by her heirs – to limit (over and 
above limitations imposed by economic rights) how authorized third parties present the 
work to the public.  By contrast, with respect to attribution rights, there remains a public 
as well as a personal interest in ensuring that the author receives credit for the work she 
created. 
  
Art. 3.4 – Right of integrity 
  
(1) The right of integrity is the right to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification, 
or other derogatory action in relation to the work, which would be prejudicial to the honour or 
reputation of the author. 
 
Comment: Adoption of the Berne Convention’s objective “honor or reputation” standard 
for violation of the integrity right rejects the subjective one such as in French law.  Thus 
the standard may be less author-protective but more predictable and better-balanced with 
the reasonable interests of exploiters. 
 
(2) This right shall last for the life of the author and until [...] years after his death. The legal 
successor as defined by the laws on inheritance27 shall be entitled to exercise the right after the 
death of the author. 
 
Comment: See comment to art. 3.3(2) above. 
  
Art. 3.5 – Consent 
 
The author can consent28 not to exercise his moral rights.29 Such consent must be limited in 
scope30, unequivocal31 and informed32.33 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
25 See note 22. 
26 As determined by the laws of inheritance, either the heirs or a person especially appointed by the author can 
exercise these moral rights. 
27 Id. 
28 Consent by the author to waive his moral right must be certain. This consent can result from a written instrument 
or may be implied if no other interpretation of the author's will can be deduced from the written instrument or from 
the particular circumstances of the case. 
29 If the author consents not to exercise his moral rights, the action consented to will not constitute an infringement 
30 General waivers are not possible, but an author may consent to particular uses.   
31 Consent in writing should be regarded as evidence that the consent was unequivocal. 
32 Consent is only informed where full information is disclosed to the author (or a representative or agent thereof) as 
to the way in which the work will be used, including details of works which will be used in association with the 
work. The waiver may result from a collective negotiation by third parties representing the interests of the authors, 




Comment: While the text seeks to bar general waivers, it would permit specific 
renunciations of moral rights, see footnote 30.  Neither the text nor the notes explicitly 
limit specific consent to authorizations granted specified co-contractants.  The absence of 
a clear limitation to agreements intuitu personae leaves open the possibility that specific 
consent might extend to the whole world, for example to any user of a website on which a 
work is posted.  The specificity requirement, moreover, may not preclude waivers in form 
contracts, so long as the circumstances under which the waiver would operate are 
sufficiently detailed.  (Footnote 33 appears to acknowledge the possibility of valid 
“standard contracts” stipulating broad waivers.) 
 Suppose, for example, that an author makes her work available with a Creative 
Commons license and chooses to forgo (or neglects to affix) the ND (no derivatives) icon 
whose use would have made clear that the author did not permit alterations to her work.  
Does the resulting implied license to create derivative works also waive the integrity 
right?  Arguably, given the proposed Code’s requirement that any waiver be “limited in 
scope” an omnibus derivative works authorization lacks the requisite specificity, and 
therefore could not be construed as a waiver of moral rights along with the economic 
rights.   
If the open-endedness of the waiver does not disqualify it, what of its 
irrevocability?  The text does not address the question whether a specific consent must be 
revocable.  While revocability would seem consonant with the concept and purpose of 
moral rights, the possible extension of permissible consent to website waivers may make 
revocation impossible.  Is it appropriate to conclude that the CC-licensing author who 
does not prohibit the making of derivative works has properly consented to waive her 
moral right of integrity notwithstanding the practical impossibility of retracting her 
waiver of derivative work/integrity rights once the work is “virally” communicated from 
one user to another? 
 
Art. 3.6 – Interests of third parties 
 
(1)  The moral rights recognised in article 3.1 will not be enforced in situations where to do so 
would harm the legitimate interests of third parties34  to an extent which is manifestly 
disproportionate to the interests of the author35.36 
 
Comment:  This is a curious provision apparently inserted to ensure that authors’ most 
personal rights are appropriately “balanced” against the broader public interest, but on 
closer inspection, its assurances seem rather insubstantial.  Consider the “legitimate 
interests of third parties,” which footnote 34 tells us includes the general public’s 
“interest in improving the access to the work.”  The only moral right that implicates 
access to the work is the right of divulgation.  But art. 3.2(2) already limits the duration 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
33 The condition of informed consent will weigh particularly heavy in cases of standard contracts stipulating a far 
reaching consent of the author not to exercise moral rights.   
34 The notion of ‘interests of third parties’ covers interests of any private party, such as a publisher, as well of the 
public in general which, for instance, has a legitimate interest in improving the access to the work. 
35 For example, particularly the integrity right would be attenuated in relation to works of low authorship. 
36 This ‘abus de droit’ principle also applies to economic rights. If it is specifically mentioned here, this is because, 
unlike the case of the economic rights, the principle is not already elabourated  in a body of  limitations.  
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of that right to the life of the author.  So art. 3.6(1) would have no role to play where the 
public interest in access is at its strongest, after the author’s death.  Would art 3.6(1) 
apply while the author is living, when her interest in deciding whether and how to 
disclose her work not only is at its strongest but also is consonant with the general public 
interest in fostering an environment conducive to creativity (since authors who cannot 
control the disclosure of their work may be less inclined to create it in the first place)?  
One might imagine situations in which the author’s invocation of her divulgation right is 
purely pretextual, not to protect her work, but to guard some secret that would not be 
protected by personal or data privacy laws.  This exceptionally marginal situation could 
serve as a classic example of abus de droit, but that overarching civil law principle, 
which, if it applies, would apply equally to economic as well as moral rights (see footnote 
36), exists alongside copyright law.  If it requires articulation in a provision specially 
devoted to curtailing moral rights in the “Interests of third parties,” one may infer that its 
inclusion reflects a perceived need to reassure third parties from common law countries. 
 Similarly, given the other articles in Chapter 3, under what circumstances would 
the author’s interest in enforcing her integrity rights be “manifestly disproportionate” to 
legitimate third party interests?  We know from art. 3.4(1) that there will be no violation 
of the integrity right unless the alteration to the work objectively harms the author’s 
honor or reputation.  In other words, the integrity right is already framed in a way that 
precludes unreasonable assertions of artistic purity.  For art. 3.6(1) to have any effect, 
then, it would have to apply in situations in which deleterious alterations to the work 
admittedly compromise the author’s good name, but there is some third party (exploiter 
or broader public) interest in dissemination of the thus-altered work that is so 
“legitimate” that it “manifestly” outweighs the author’s reputation.   Perhaps parody 
might fit that bill, but parody is a well-recognized exception to authors’ rights even in 
strong moral rights systems (see, e.g., France, CPI L122-5 4o; see also Wittem draft art. 
5.2(1)(e)), so it is not clear why a special additional provision benefitting third parties is 
required. 
 Finally, regarding the attribution right, footnote 24 to art. 3.3(2) already 
incorporates the reasonableness considerations that art 3.6 purports to advance.  In other 
words, moral rights in the proposed Code are in the first instance so couched in the 
interests of third parties that it becomes difficult to imagine how authors’ interests could 
become “manifestly disproportionate,” much less require further belittlement in this 
article. 
 
(2)  After the author’s death, the moral rights of attribution and integrity shall only be exercised 
in a manner that takes into account the interests in protecting the person of the deceased author, 
as well as the legitimate interests of third parties. 
  
Comment: This is another variation on abus de droit, and prompts queries similar to 
those raised in connection with art. 3.6(1). 
 
 
Chapter 4: Economic rights  
 




(1) The economic rights in a work are37 the exclusive rights to authorise or prohibit the 
reproduction, distribution, rental,38 communication to the public and adaptation of the work, in 
whole or in part,39 as provided for in articles 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. 
 
Comment:  The proposed Code proffers a closed list of exclusive rights.  (See footnote 
37.)  It eschews any residual right to control or benefit from the exploitation of the work.  
As a result, if a new mode of exploitation develops that cannot be fit within any of the 
enumerated rights, third parties may exploit the work with no pay to or permission from 
the author.  Whether such a situation is likely to transpire depends on whether the 
enumerated rights are drafted sufficiently broadly.  While the articulation of the right of 
communication to the public purports to be an “open concept” (also per note 37) the 
narrower expression of the other exclusive rights could in the future produce gaps in 
coverage. 
  
 (2) The economic rights expire [...] years40 after the year of the author’s death. 
 
Comment:  While agreeing that the current EU term of 70 years pma is too long, the 
drafters could not agree on the length of a shorter term (see footnote 41), thus making no 
effective prescription for national laws. 
  
Art. 4.2 – Right of reproduction 
 
The right of reproduction is the right to reproduce the work in any manner or form, including 
temporary reproduction insofar41 as it has independent42 economic significance.43 
 
Comment: This concise provision masks several problems.  The requirement that the 
reproduction have independent economic significance, which applies only to temporary 
reproductions (see footnote 41), purports to be consistent with art. 5(1) of the Information 
Society Directive (see footnote 43), but in fact departs from it in significant ways, as we 
will see.  The text’s understanding of “independent” also is troublesome.  Footnote 42 
defines “independent” as meaning independent from a use “permitted either by law or 
authorised by the right holder”.  This is problematic because it conflates exceptions and 
                                                            
37 This article comprises an exhaustive (closed) list of the economic rights. Note, however, that ‘communication to 
the public’ is an open concept, and art. 4.5 comprises a non-exhaustive (open) list of acts falling under that concept. 
38 As explained in the Introduction, the public lending right and the artists’ resale right (droit de suite) are not 
included here, because these are remuneration rights that do not qualify as exclusive economic rights and as such 
remain outside the scope of the Code. 
39 The phrase ‘in whole or in part’ implies that the use of a part of a protected work constitutes a restricted act or, as 
the case may be, an infringement, if this part in and by itself qualifies for copyright protection. 
40 It was generally felt by the members of the Group that the current term of protection of the economic rights is too 
long. However views diverged as to the appropriate term. 
41 The phrase ‘insofar as it has independent economic significance’ only refers to temporary reproductions. 
42 The term ‘independent’ means independent from a permitted use (i.e. permitted either by law or authorised by the 
right holder).   
43 This carve-out absorbs the rule of art. 5(1) InfoSoc Directive.  
Note that it does not determine the burden of proof whether or not the reproduction in question is or is not temporary 
and/or has no independent economic significance.  
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exclusive rights.  In other words, when an author claims infringement, the first inquiry 
should be whether the act complained-of comes within the scope of exclusive rights; if 
so, then the second inquiry looks to applicable exceptions.  Here however, the cart 
precedes the horse: if the economically significant act qualifies for an exception, then the 
reproduction right is not engaged.  It makes more sense first to assess whether the 
temporary reproduction has value independent of the more permanent reproduction to 
which the temporary reproduction may lead; if the answer is “no,” it is not even 
necessary then to determine whether the temporary reproduction nonetheless would be 
excused.  There is, moreover, some incoherence in the class of temporary reproductions 
whose economic significance derives from an exempted use.  After all, it is their 
economic insignificance that most often underlies the exceptions for “permitted acts” (cf. 
Berne Conv. art. 9.2; but, as we will see regarding Chapter 5, the proposed Code 
substantially enlarges the scope of copyright exceptions, including in favor of 
commercial activities). 
 With respect to the correspondence between art. 5(1) of the Information Society 
Directive and Wittem draft art. 4.2, the proposed Code differs from the Directive not only 
in its initial approach, but in the nature of and conditions for exclusion of temporary 
reproductions.  First, because temporary reproductions in the Directive are classified 
among the exceptions to copyright, it is clear that the reproductions as an initial matter 
come within the scope of copyright (there is no need to exempt an activity unless it would 
otherwise be subject to the copyright owner’s exclusive rights).  By contrast, the 
proposed Code initially truncates the reach of reproduction right; exceptions do not come 
into play (except in the convoluted inquiry into the independence of economic 
significance, as discussed above) because the right does not reach the activity in the first 
place.  Second, where the Proposed Code addresses “temporary” reproductions without 
specifying the circumstances in which such reproductions may be created, the Directive 
confines its exception to “temporary acts of reproduction which are transient or incidental 
[and] an integral and essential part of a technological process . . .”  The contrast suggests 
that the “temporary” reproductions that the proposed Code removes from the scope of 
exclusive rights may cover far less “transient” fixations than those exempted by the 
Directive.  Third, because the question of transient reproductions comes within 
Directive’s provisions on exceptions, it should fall to the defendant to prove compliance 
with the distinct and cumulative conditions of lawful use and absence of independent 
economic significance.  By contrast, as footnote 43 points out, the proposed Code does 
not assign the burden of proof; logically, however, in the realm of rights assertion, the 
burden would fall on the claimant.  Finally, where the application of the Directive’s 
transitory copy exception must also conform to the “3-step test” (InfoSoc Directive art 
5(5)), the proposed Code eludes that additional safeguard by characterizing the issue of 
temporary copies as one of initial scope of the reproduction right rather than as an 
exception to an otherwise applicable exclusive right. 
 
 Art. 4.3 – Right of distribution 
 




(2) The right of distribution does not apply to the distribution of the original or any copy that has 
been put on the market by the holder of the copyright or with his consent.44  
 
Comment: Subsection (2) states a rule of exhaustion of the distribution right, but the 
scope of the rule is unclear.  Read literally, “the market” is not limited to the market in 
the European Union.  Thus, and contrary to current ECJ case-law [E.g., Silhouette 
International Schmied GmbH v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH, ECJ Case C-355/96 
(16 July 1998)], sale of copies of the work anywhere in the world would cut off the 
distribution right, making the copies freely importable into the EU and of course re-
sellable anywhere within the EU.  If read against the background of current EU law, “the 
market” would be understood to mean “any member State of the European Union.” 
Footnote 44’s reference to the exhaustion of industrial property rights suggests that, for 
now at least, “the market” does mean the EU.  As a general matter, the issue of 
“international exhaustion” is controversial, but neither the Berne Convention nor the 
TRIPs Accord bar a member State from limiting the author’s right to control the 
distribution of physical copies to copies that she has not yet sold, on any national market.  
If the proposed Code is read literally, or if the referenced rule regarding exhaustion of 
industrial property rights changes, then the “closed list” nature of its exclusive rights 
would preclude any State that adopts the Code from revising the distribution right to 
include control over copies sold outside the national or regional market. 
 
 Art. 4.4 – Right of rental 
 
(1) The right of rental is the right to make available the original of the work or copies thereof for 
use for a limited period of time for profit making purposes. 
(2) The right of rental does not extend to the rental of buildings and works of applied art. 
 
Comment: If the exhaustion rule constrains the scope of the distribution right, the 
separately articulated “right of rental” would extend control over physical copies with 
respect to their commercial rental.  The rental right does not reach not for profit uses, and 
therefore non commercial libraries, for example, would not be affected.  The proposed 
Code also sensibly exempts buildings and works of applied art.  By contrast, the for-
profit rental of works of visual art, such as paintings and sculptures, would be subject to 
the authorization of the copyright owner, as would audiovisual works, such as motion 
pictures and videogames.  (The rental of sound recordings falls outside the scope of the 
proposed Code, which does not address the subject matter of neighbouring rights, see art. 
1.1, footnote 1.) 
  
Art. 4.5 – Right of communication to the public 
 
(1)  The right of communication to the public is the right to communicate the work to the public, 
including but not limited to45 public performance46, broadcasting47, and making available to the 
                                                            
44 This rule of exhaustion has to be interpreted coherently with the same concept in the law of industrial property.  




public of the work in such a way that members of the public may access it from a place and at a 
time individually chosen by them.  
 
Comment: The proposed Code offers an “open-ended and non-exhaustive” (footnote 45) 
communication right.  The flexibility of the right should enable its adaptation to new 
conditions, both through expansive interpretation of its terms, and through inclusion of 
modes of public communication absent from the article’s illustrative list.  An example of 
the latter is the right of public display.  Footnote 46 mentions “public display (i.e. on as 
screen)”; it is not clear whether the drafters contemplated public display of a physical 
copy of a work, such as the display of a sculpture, a painting, or a photograph in a place 
open to the public such as a restaurant or a gallery.  But such a right could come within 
the scope of art. 4.5 
 With respect to new modes of communication, the proposed Code adopts the 
language of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 8, and the InfoSoc Directive, art. 3(1), 
covering the “making available” right.  It should therefore be clear from the text that the 
author’s exclusive right reaches not only traditional “push” technologies, such as 
broadcasting, but also individualized on-demand “pull” technologies such as digital 
streaming and downloading.  The following subsection, however, may create some 
confusion regarding what constitutes a communication “to the public.” 
 
(2) A communication of a work shall be deemed to be to the public if it is intended for a plurality 
of persons, unless such persons are connected by personal relationship. 
 
 Comment: The language “intended for a plurality of persons” should not be 
misunderstood to remove from the scope of the exclusive right the communication of 
works to one user at a time.  Article 4.5(1) should establish that the relevant “intent” with 
respect to the concept of communication to the public does not focus on whether a 
particular communication of a work is intended to be received only by a single member 
of the public, but rather whether an offer to communicate the work was made to “a 
plurality of persons.”  To interpret to the public to require that a particular delivery or 
transmission of the work be simultaneously conveyed to a plurality of persons would 
substantially eviscerate the making available right.  
More problematically, however, the exclusion from “the public” of persons 
“connected by a personal relationship” seems exceedingly vague and potentially 
overbroad.  What, in the digital era, is a “personal relationship”?  For example, are 
Facebook “friends” “connected by a personal relationship”?  The drafters’ choice to go 
beyond traditional criteria like “family circle” or “circle of family and its social 
acquaintance” risks opening up the category of “non public” to an extent inconsistent 
with the author’s limited monopoly over the public communication of her work.      
 
Art. 4.6 – Right of adaptation 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
46 Public performance also includes public recitation, “public communication by loudspeaker or any other analogous 
instrument transmitting, by signs, sounds or images of the broadcast of the work” (art. 11bis (1)(iii) BC) and public 
display (i.e. on a screen). 
47 The term ‘broadcasting’ includes rebroadcasting and retransmitting, by wireless and wired (cable) means. 
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 The right of adaptation is the right to adapt, translate, arrange or otherwise alter the work. 
 
  
Chapter 5: Limitations48 
  
Art. 5.1 Uses with minimal economic significance 
 
The following uses with minimal economic significance are permitted without authorisation, and 
without remuneration:49 
 
Comment: The proposed Code appears to declare that the following uses are of minimal 
economic significance (even though they are not limited to non commercial uses).  Such 
an automatic designation is problematic, for the apparent assumption may not always be 
true.  If, instead, the phrasing is ambiguous, and minimal economic significance is a 
threshold condition which must be proved, then who bears the burden? Does the 
proposed code create a presumption that the uses have minimal economic significance, or 
(as would normally be the case with exceptions) must the precondition be proved by the 
defendant?     
 
(1) the making of a back-up copy of a work by a person having a right to use it and insofar as it 
is necessary for that use; 
 
Comment:  The text does not include an obligation to destroy the back-up copy if its 
maker ceases to have the right to use the work, for example, if she gives the initial copy 
to someone else.  (Compare 17 USC sec 117.)  But perhaps that duty is implicit; the use 
would not be of “minimal economic significance” if it fostered creation and retention of 
back-up copies replacing source copies put into recirculation. 
 
                                                            
48 For the sake of clarity, limitations have been brought together under several categories. The categories do not 
however prejudice as to the question, what interests do, or should, in a particular case or even in general, underlie 
the limitation. In practice, this might be a mixture of several of the interests indicated.  The weakness in a particular 
case of the interest under which the applicable limitation has been categorized does not prejudice as to the (non-) 
applicability of the limitation.  
However, the concrete examples enumerated under those categories do have a normative effect, since art. 5.5 
extends the scope of the specifically enumerated limitations by permitting other uses that are similar to any of the 
uses enumerated, subject to the operation of the three-step test.  
In this way, Chapter 5 reflects a combination of a common law style open-ended system of limitations and a civil 
law style exhaustive enumeration. On the one hand, the extension to similar uses provides the system with a 
flexibility which is indispensable in view of the fact that it is impossible to foresee all the situations in which a 
limitation could be justified. On the other hand, the possibility of flexibility is narrowed down in two ways. Firstly, 
the extension applies to uses ‘similar’ to the ones expressly enumerated. Thus, a certain normative effect is bestowed 
on these examples; the courts can only permit uses not expressly enumerated insofar as a certain analogy can be 
established with uses that are mentioned by the Code.  
Secondly, such similar uses may not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author or rightholder, taking account of the legitimate interests of third 
parties.  
49 With regard to the question, whether a limitation permits the use act in question or not, the Code does not 
distinguish between analogue and digital uses. However, a distinction might be made in respect of the amount of 
remuneration due for certain uses; see note 57. 
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(2) the incidental inclusion of a work in other material; 
 
Comment: It is not clear what “incidental inclusion” means.  Accidental and 
unintentional incorporation of a copyrighted work when the including work’s focus was 
on something else?  The amount of the incorporated work was of minimal quantity or 
duration?  Must the inclusion be all of accidental, unfocused and minimal?  Moreover, 
the scope of the exception appears to be considerably broader than the conduct exempted 
in Berne Conv. art. 10bis(2), which permits reproduction and communication of literary 
or artistic works seen or heard in the course of an event which is the subject of news 
reporting, “to the extent justified by the informatory purpose.”   
 
(3) use in connection with the demonstration or repair of equipment, or the  reconstruction of an 
original or a copy of a work.  
 
Comment: It is not clear what “reconstruction” means.  The exception might cover 
copying for archival preservation, but the language in fact may not concern copying at 
all.  That is, if “reconstruction” means restoring the original or a copy, for example, of a 
painting, then it is not apparent how any exclusive rights are implicated in the first place, 
because the “reconstruction” is occurring directly on the same physical medium.  If there 
is no copying to start with, there is no need for this exception. 
 
Art. 5.2 Uses for the purpose of freedom of expression and information 
 
(1) The following uses for the purpose of freedom of expression and information are permitted 
without authorisation and without remuneration, to the extent justified by the purpose of the use 
 
Comment:  It bears emphasizing that all of the following unremunerated uses can be for 
commercial purposes.  Moreover, it would appear that all of the following uses could be 
of the work in its entirety.  Finally, the purpose of many of the uses seems very open-
ended.  As a result each raises questions regarding its conformity with the three-step test.  
Only Wittem Draft art. 5.5 incorporates the three-step test (in part); the juxtaposition 
suggests the drafters assumed that article 5.2 (and 5.1, 5.3 and 5.4) conform to the 
requirements, notably, that the exempted uses be confined to “certain special cases,” and 
that they neither “conflict with a normal exploitation of the work” nor “unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”  Examination of the scope of these 
exceptions suggests that assumption may not always be correct. 
 
(a)  use of a work for the purpose of the reporting of contemporary events; 
 
Comment: This exception is broader than the news reporting exceptions of Berne Conv. 
art. 10bis, which concern incidental incorporation of works or republication of news 
articles or broadcasts.  Here the focus of the use may be the work of authorship, which 
can be of any kind, not merely a prior news source.  The proposed Code does not, 
moreover, specify that the work used must itself be the subject of the event. Thus, while 
news coverage of an exhibition of artworks could, under this exception, show the 
artworks that are on exhibit, it would seem that the news coverage could also display 




(b)  use of published articles on current economic, political or religious topics or of similar works 
broadcast by the media, provided that such use is not expressly reserved; 
 
Comment:  The scope of this exception is somewhat constrained because the works 
subject to the exception are those “broadcast by the media”.  But “broadcasting” covers a 
much narrower scope of activity than “communicated” or even “transmitted.”  Berne 
Conv. art 10bis(1) appears to be the source of this technological limitation (as well as this 
subsection’s allowance for express reservation).  But this subsection omits art. 10bis(1)’s 
further condition that the source of the copied work “must always be clearly indicated.”  
While art. 5.6(2) clarifies that the attribution right applies to art. 5.2 exceptions, the 
“source” of a copied work is broader than the name of the author, as it may also include 
the name of the publication in which the author’s work appeared.    
 
(c)  use of works of architecture or sculpture, made to be located permanently in public places; 
 
Comment:  This exception is somewhat perplexing, although, in fairness, the problem is 
not of the drafters’ making; it derives from art. 5(3)(h) of the InfoSoc Directive, faithfully 
reproduced here.  Nonetheless, since elsewhere the drafters have not been shy about 
“improving” on the Directive’s exceptions, they might also have foregone its ambiguities.  
In this case, does “made to be located permanently in public places” require investigation 
of the subjective intent of artist in creating the work?  How would the user who 
encounters a sculpture in a public place know whether the artist intended its placement 
there, or, for that matter, whatever the artist’s intent, whether the sculpture will be located 
“permanently” in a public place?  And what constitutes a “public place”?  For example, 
how should one characterize private places that are open to the public, such as entrances 
to office buildings, interiors of restaurants and retail establishments, shopping malls . . . 
 
(d)  use by way of quotation of lawfully disclosed works50; 
 
Comment: It is not clear whether this exception implies that the “quotation” (which 
footnote 50 tells us could be the entire work) must be incorporated in an independent 
work, or whether the “quotation” may be reiterated standing alone.  Is it assumed that the 
preambular phrase “to the extent justified by the purpose of the use” subsumes the Berne 
Conv. requirement of consistency with fair practice?   
 
(e)  use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche. 
  
(2) The following uses for the purpose of freedom of expression and information are 
permitted without authorisation, but only against payment of remuneration and to the 
extent justified by the purpose of the use: 
 
(a) use of single articles for purposes of internal reporting within an organisation; 
 
                                                            




Comment: It is very unclear what “internal reporting within an organization” means.  If 
the exception is meant to permit multiple reproductions of single articles for distribution 
within an organization, for example to convert one journal subscription into multiple 
copies of individual articles, it would most likely run afoul of the three-step test.  If the 
exception is meant to concern clipping services, its phrasing does not correspond to the 
nature of the use, at least not to the extent that the clipping service is external to the 
organization that is the object of the news clippings.  
 
(b) use for purposes of scientific research. 
 
Comment: The proposed Code’s failure to restrict the scope of this exception to non 
commercial, not for profit scientific research, its lack of definition of the nature of the 
“purposes of scientific research,” as well as its absence of limitation as to the kinds of 
works subject to the exception, make the consistency of this exception with Berne Conv. 
art. 9(2) very problematic notwithstanding its requirement that the use be remunerated. 
 
Art. 5.3 – Uses Permitted to Promote Social, Political and Cultural Objectives 
 
(1) The following uses for the purpose of promoting social, political and cultural objectives are 
permitted without authorisation and without remuneration, and to the extent justified by the 
purpose of the use: 
 
 (a) use for the benefit of persons with a disability, which is directly related to the disability and 
of a non-commercial nature; 
(b) use to ensure the proper performance of administrative, parliamentary or judicial proceedings 
or public security;51  
(c) use for the purpose of non-commercial archiving by publicly accessible libraries, educational 
establishments or museums, and archives52. 
  
(2) The following uses for the purpose of promoting important social, political and cultural 
objectives are permitted without authorisation, but only against payment of remuneration, and to 
the extent justified by the purpose of the use: 
 
(a) reproduction by a natural person for private use, provided that the source from which the 
reproduction is made is not an obviously infringing copy; 
 
Comment: It is not clear whether the text assumes that private copying in fact promotes 
“social, political and cultural objectives,” or whether the user bears the burden of proving 
such promotion.  The latter may be a difficult task.  On the other hand, if such promotion 
is not susceptible of proof, perhaps even compensated private copying is not justified, at 
least not under this rubric.  Limitation of the exception to source copies that are not 
“obviously infringing” should ensure that unauthorized peer-to-peer copying is not 
                                                            
51 The reporting of administrative, parliamentary or judicial proceedings is covered by art. 5.2 (1)(a). 
52 See art. 5 (2)(c) Information Society Directive. It is understood that the exception only covers reproductions made 




sheltered under a private copying exemption (although illegal P2P services rarely 
compensate creators and therefore the copying would in any event not qualify for the 
exception). 
 
(b)    use for educational purposes. 
 
 Comment: The proposed Code’s failure to restrict the scope of this exception to non 
commercial, not for profit educational purposes, its lack of definition of the nature of the 
“educational purpose,” as well as its absence of limitation as to the kinds of works subject 
to the exception, make the consistency of this exception with Berne Conv. art. 9(2) very 
problematic notwithstanding its requirement that the use be remunerated. 
 
 
Art. 5.4 –Uses for the purpose of enhancing competition  
 
 Comment: It is not at all clear what this provision covers.  The two instances in (1) do 
not necessarily involve “competition.”    Moreover, there may be a fundamental 
incoherence in incorporating “competition” limitations into laws whose purpose is to 
endow authors with the competitive advantage that exclusive rights confer.  
 
(1)       The following uses for the purpose of enhancing competition are permitted without 
authorisation and without remuneration, to the extent justified by the purpose of the use: 
 
(a) use for the purpose of advertising public exhibitions or sales of artistic works or goods which 
have been lawfully put on the market;53 
(b) use for the purpose of reverse engineering in order to obtain access to information, by a 
person entitled to use the work. 
 
 Comment: Subsection (b) is missing a further element: the purpose of the information to 
which access is gained by reverse engineering.  Compare the Software Directive, art. 6, 
which authorizes reverse engineering for the purpose of accessing information “necessary 
to achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer program with other 
programs.” 
(2) Uses of news articles, scientific works, industrial designs, computer programs and databases 
are permitted without authorisation, but only against payment of a negotiated remuneration,54 
and to the extent justified by the purpose of the use,  provided that: 
 
(i)  the use is indispensable to compete on a derivative market; 
 
Comment: It is unclear what “derivative market” means (and no footnotes clarify the 
term’s meaning or scope).  If it includes the market for derivative works then this 
                                                            
53 The means of advertising as mentioned in art. 5.4 (1) should be normal and proportionate for the business. 
54 The term ‘negotiated remuneration’ means that the compulsory license fee is to be negotiated in individual cases, 
and therefore does not imply a role for collective rights management.   
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provision may be in some tension with the adaptation right set out at art. 4.6 (and 
mandated by Berne Conv. art. 12). 
 
(ii)  the owner of the copyright in the work has refused to license the use on reasonable terms, 
leading to the elimination of competition in the relevant market and 
 
Comment: If the “relevant market” is the market for the work, then this exception is 
either incoherent or fundamentally at odds with an essential feature of copyright law, 
which is to vest the author with exclusive rights. 
 
(iii)  the use does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the owner of the 
copyright in the work. 
 
Comment: Why just Step 3 of the three-step test?  Is the prior step - that the use will not 
conflict with a normal exploitation – simply assumed?  The prior analysis, however, 
suggests the contrary determination. 
  
Art. 5.5 – Further limitations 
 
Any other use that is comparable to the uses enumerated in art. 5.1 to 5.4(1) is permitted 
provided that the corresponding requirements of the relevant limitation are met and the use does 
not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author or rightholder, taking account of the legitimate interests of third 
parties.55 
 
Comment: This provision is exceptionally open-ended, making it suspect under the 
(unmentioned) first step of the three-step test.  The following hypothetical tests the 
breadth of this article.  Consider the Google book-scanning project.  Is the use analogous 
to art 5.2 uses for freedom of “information”?  (Are books “information”?  Is the content 
that Google would make available in “snippet” form “information”?) Are the snippets 
analogous to “quotations” under art. 5.2(1)(d)?  Does it matter under art. 5.2(1)(d) that 
Google makes and retains a copy of the entire work in order to generate the “snippets”?  
Is the use analogous to art 5.3’s category of social-cultural uses?  One could contend that 
the book-scanning program expands public access to “culture” in the form of books in 
libraries.  With respect to the criteria of 5.2(1) (non remunerated uses) – only (d) seems 
possible, and only if “quotation” permits incorporation of the whole work (in Google’s 
database) and does not imply incorporation in a work of the person making the quotation 
(“snippets” are displayed as such, not as part of a larger expressive work).  (By contrast, 
analogy to the criteria of 5.3(1) would not assist Google.  Subsection (c)’s archiving 
purpose is limited to non commercial uses, but Google is for-profit.)  Art 5.2(1) thus 
could be interpreted broadly enough to permit Google’s book-scanning, storage and 
communication activities, though such an interpretation is rather aggressive.  But given 
the Wittem Draft’s invitation to interpret exceptions “flexibly” and the “legitimate 
interests of third parties” in “access to information” about books, particularly books 
whose rightholders may be hard to find, it is conceivable that Google’s for-profit uses 
                                                            
55 See note 48. Note that art. 5.5 does not allow new limitations by blending the criteria of articles 5.1 to 5.3. 
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could be privileged.  Depending on where one stands on the “balance” between creators 
and entrepreneurial users, this “flexibility” either is necessary to advance the public 
interest, particularly in light of evolving technology, or is a dangerous erosion of authors’ 
rights, undermining their ability to profit from new markets created by new technologies.  
 
Art. 5.6 – Relation with moral rights 
 
(1) Uses under this chapter are permitted without prejudice to the right of divulgation under 
article 3.2.56  
 
(2) Uses pursuant to articles 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 are permitted without prejudice to the right of 
attribution under article 3.3, unless such attribution is not reasonably possible. 
 
(3) Uses pursuant to articles 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5, are permitted without prejudice to the right of 
integrity under article 3.4, unless the applicable limitation allows for such an alteration or the 
alteration is reasonably due to the technique of reproduction or communication applied by the 
use. 
 
Comment:  Subsection (2) appears to suspend the right of attribution (at least fails to 
preserve the right through a “without prejudice” guarantee) with respect to the article 5.1 
exceptions, notably “incidental use” and use for “reconstruction.”  Subsection (3) 
suspends the right of integrity with respect to uses to promote competition, notably uses 
of news articles, scientific works, industrial designs, computer programs and databases 
necessary to competition in a “derivative market.”  It is not clear why beneficiaries of the 
art. 5.1 exceptions should be absolved of any duty to attribute authorship.  If “incidental” 
use clearly were limited to fleeting and minimal incorporation of the work of authorship, 
one might acknowledge that adding authorship credit might in those circumstances be 
unreasonable.  But subsection (2) already contains a general reasonableness limitation on 
the attribution right, so the exclusion of art. 5.1 uses must truncate the attribution right 
even further, without apparent justification.  The suspension of the right of integrity with 
respect to news articles, scientific works, etc. necessary to competition in derivative 
markets also is puzzling and troublesome, for it suggests that “derivative markets” may 
include the making of derivative works (see comment to art. 5.4).  If so, then not only 
would the derivative works not require authorization, they also would be dispensed from 
any obligation of fidelity to the underlying work.   
 
Art. 5.7 – Amount and collection of remuneration 
 
(1) Any remuneration provided for under this chapter shall be fair and adequate57. 
                                                            
56 This provision does not prejudice as to the direct application of the fundamental right of freedom of expression. It 
is however understood that only in highly exceptional cases, such as quotation in the press of important secret 
documents, there could be a ground for such a correction. 
57 While no distinction of analogue and digital use acts shall be made with regard to the question of the permission 
of the use act as such, it seems appropriate to differentiate the amount of remuneration due depending on the 
economic significance of the use act to the user.  It should be noted that the use can be made by a third party on 
behalf of beneficiaries of these limitations, but that in such cases the remuneration to be paid may be higher than if it 




(2)  A claim for remuneration according to articles 5.2(2) and 5.3(2) can only be exercised by a 
collecting society. 
         
Comment: The requirement that collecting societies make the claims for remuneration 
for compulsorily-licensed private copying, scientific research and educational uses would 
seem to reduce the transactions costs associated with the implementation of the 
remuneration right.  But why, then, does art 5.4(2) explicitly exclude collecting societies? 
 
Art. 5.8 – Limitations prevailing over technical measures58 
 
In cases where the use of copyright protected works is controlled by technical measures, the 
rightholder shall have an obligation to make available means of benefiting from the uses 
mentioned in articles 5.1 through 5.5 with the exception of art. 5.3(2)(a) [private copying], on 
condition that 
 
(a) the beneficiary of the limitation has lawful access to the protected work, 
(b) the use of the work is not possible to the extent necessary to benefit from the limitation 
concerned, and 
(c) the rightholder is not prevented from adopting adequate measures regarding the number of 
reproductions that can be made. 
 
Comment: The exclusion of private copying from the rightholder’s obligation to “make 
available means of benefiting from the uses mentioned in articles 5.1 through 5.5” 
appears to mean that the rightholder can technologically override the private copying 
exception.  Whether this provision in effect neutralizes that exception depends on norms 
the Wittem Draft does not address, notably whether circumventing technological 
protections is prohibited.  Under the InfoSoc Directive, art. 6, and the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty, art. 11, member States are obliged to protect against circumvention; assuming 
those norms prevail, it would seem that the effective subsistence of the private copying 
exception is left to the rightholder’s choice whether or not to apply technological 
measures.  But if the Wittem Draft is meant to coexist with EU norms, then art. 5.8 may 
be in some tension with InfoSoc Directive art. 6.4, which obliges rightholders to permit 
users to benefit from a variety of exceptions, including private copying, although 




58 Note that the Code does not otherwise deal with the legal protection of technical protection measures. 
 
